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STUDENT NOTES
INSURANCE-RIGHT OF BENEFICIARY WHO HAS CAUSED DATni OF
INSURED TO SHARE IN P OCEEDS OF INSURANCE POLIcy.-Samuel Reed
procured a policy of insurance on his life in which his wife, Dora Reed,
was made the sole beneficiary. Subsequently he was feloniously killed
by said Dora Reed. This was an action on the policy for the benefit
of the estate by Harry E. Davis, administrator, who alleged that the
conviction of the crime of manslaughter for said killing made it im-
possible for the beneficiary to recover, inasmuch as she feloniously
caused the death. The lower court directed a verdict in favor of the
plaintiff and the defendant appealed. It is claimed by the defendant
that if the administrator is permitted to recover, the wife or widow of
the insured, being one of those entitled to a distributive share of the
estate, would thus indirectly take the benefits, or be interested in the
benefits derived from tile suit, and therefore, it will be defeating the
general rule that the beneficiary in a life insurance policy cannot
reover thereon, where the death of the assured is caused by the inten-
tional and felonious act of such beneficiary. The court held however,
that she would not take in suchY case as a beneficiary but as one of
those who are entitled to a distributive share of the husband's estate;
that It is not right that the insurance company after receiving the
premiums should be able to avoid responsibility upon the policy. It
has got that which it contracted fof, and it is only fair and right that
the estate should get the results of the insurance policy; and the fact
that the person who caused the death of the husband incidenally gets
something Is no legal reason for preventing recovery by the estate.
Therefore the judgment of the lower court was affirmed. National
Ben. Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, 176 N. E. (Ohio) 490.
There Is little need to discuss the general rule that where the
beneficiary intentionally and feloniously causes the death of the
Insured, there can be no recovery on the policy in favor of such wrong-
doer. New York Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U. S. 591, 6 S. Ct.
877, 29 L. Ed. 997 (1886); Slocum v. Metropolitan L. Ins. Co., 245 Mass.
565, 139 N. E. 816, 27 A. L. R. 1517 (1923); Cleaver v. Mutual Reserve
Fund Life Assoc., 1 Q. B. 147 (1892). However, the beneficiary Is not
denied recovery by reason of his act causing the death of insured where
such act was unintentional, Hull v. Metropolitan L. Ins. Co., 26
Pa. Dist. 197 (1917); or where the act was not felonious. Holden v.
Ancient Order of United Workmen, 159 Ill. 619, 43 N. E. 772, 31 L. R. A.
67 (1895).
But the fact that the beneficiary cannot recover on the.policy does
not always relieve the insurance company. As was said In the prin-
cipal case, the company has received the premiums and it would not
be right for it to avoid responsibility on the policy. Different problems
arise where the beneficiary is, and is not, a party to the contract,
therefore they will be considered separately.
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Where the murderous beneficiary is not a party to the contract,
his interest is equitable in nature. Since he does not have clean hands,
he cannot ask equity for aid. His right having failed, a resulting trust
is declared in favor of the murdered settlor's estate and the insurer
must pay the amount of the premium to the insured's personal repre-
sentatives to be distributed as other personal estate. MacDonald v. Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 178 Iowa 863, 160 N. W. 29 (1916); Anderson v. Life Ins.
Go., 152 N. C. 1, 67 S. E. 53 (1910); 16 Col. L. R. 52. But where the
murderer is an heir or distributee, he is generally excluded. MacDonald
v. Mut. Lfle Ins. Co., 178 Iowa 863, 160 N. W. 289 (1916); Johnston v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Go., 85 W. Va. 70, 100 S. E. 865, 7 A. L. R. 823
(1919).
The wife's right to her share of the proceeds from the estate is not
directly involved in the principal case. But the language of the case
would indicate that the court favors her receiving as an heir or dis-
tributee her share of the proceeds of the policy. In this particular the
case is not in accord with the weight of authority. However, the court
Is not without precedent in so saying. In Shellenberger v. Ranson, 41
Neb. 631, 59 N. W. 635, 25 L. R. A. 564 (1894), and in Owens v. Owens,
100 N. 0. 240, 6 S. E. 794 (1888), it was held that under American
constitutions and statutes prohibiting forfeitures or corruption of blood
upon conviction of a felony, the heir's right of inheritance is not for-
feited by his murdering his ancestor. On this ground it was held in
Murchison v. Murchison, 203 S. W. 423 (Tex.) (1918), that while a
wife murdering her husband could n6t recover as beneficiary of his
insurance policy, the action of the deceased husband's administrator
was not defeated by the fact that the wife would, under the statutes
of descent and distribution, be sole distributee.
In Slocum v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (supra), the administrator
of the insured was allowed to recover against the insurer, but the
court ordered that none of this money should enure to the benefit of
the murderer, who was a distributee of the insured. The court said
at page 818 of 139 N. E., "While the question is not now directly before
us as to what disposition the administrator must make of the money
. . . it may be added that, if any of it should remain after the pay-
ments of the debts of the insured and charges of administration, It
cannot go to Miller, who feloniously took her life. The same principle
of public policy which precludes him from claiming directly under the
insurance contract, equally precludes him from claiming under the
statute of descent and distribution." It is submitted that this is the
majority rule as well as the better rule.
Where the murderer has taken out the policy upon the life of the
slain man, and has himself paid the premiums, a different problem
arises. He has the legal as well as the equitable title to the policy.
The insured had no interest in it and there is no basis for a resulting
trust. Since the owner forfeited his entire right in the policy by his
crime, the duty of the insurer to pay is wholly extinguished.
JAEs C. LYNE.
